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Does more education really mean less poverty and less inequality? How much less? What 
are the transmission mechanisms? This paper presents the results of a micro-simulation 
exercise for the Brazilian State of Ceará, which suggests that broad-based policies aimed at 
increasing educational attainment would have substantial impacts on poverty reduction, but 
muted effects on inequality. These results are highly dependent on assumptions about the 
behaviour of returns to education, both for the distribution of earnings and for the 
distribution of household income per capita. A large share of the poverty  reducing effect of 
more education operates through greater incentives for labour force participation among 
the poor, and through reductions in fertility. Both of these effects function largely through 
decisions made by poor women. 
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1.  Introduction 
Ever since the introduction of the Human Capital model by Gary Becker and Jacob 
Mincer, economists have thought of earnings and income distributions as being 
fundamentally determined by the interaction between educational endowments and their 
market rates of return. In the specific case of Brazil, the seminal analysis of the country’s 
income distribution by Carlos Langoni (1973) very much confirmed that view, and made 
education  into the principal suspect in the search for culprits for the country’s extreme 
levels of inequality. More recently, Barros et al. (2000) found that about 40 percent of 
overall inequality in the country’s personal distribution of income could be ascribed t o 
education.  
 
In consequence, it has been widely assumed that if a government wishes to reduce poverty 
and inequality in a country like Brazil, the first policy it ought to adopt should be a general 
expansion of education.1 Nevertheless, the historical evidence causes one to be less 
sanguine: in the United States, where 93 percent of the population reports nine or more 
years of schooling, income inequality has not been falling recently. The literature speaks of 
a changing structure of returns to education, whereby skill-biased technical progress (and 
in some contexts, possibly international trade) might be increasing demand for highly-
educated workers, and offsetting (or more than offsetting) some of the equalizing results of 
expanding education. See Tinbergen (1975) for the classic reference, and Katz and Murphy 
(1992) for evidence on the US. 
 
How might a substantial increase in the stock of education affect the income distribution in 
Brazil? In this paper, we simulate the impacts of a substantial expansion of education for 
the North-eastern Brazilian state of Ceará. This state was chosen precisely because of its 
very low educational endowments: mean years of schooling in the population (aged fifteen 
or older) was 4.5 in 1999. In the same year, forty-six percent of that population had fewer 
than four years of schooling. At the same time, Ceará's economy was not made up 
exclusively of subsistence agriculture. Forty-six percent of those employed worked in 
services or commerce, and another fourteen percent in industry. Under these conditions, it 
seemed to us that if an educational expansion would matter anywhere, it would matter 
here.2 
 
The simulation is carried out at the household level, using the complete Ceará sub-sample 
of the IBGE’s 1999 Pesquisa Nacional p or Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD). In addition to 
simulating the effects on earnings of people having more education to trade in the labour 
market, under different sets of assumptions about the evolution of returns, we also consider 
the likely effects of additional education on labour force participation, occupational choice 
                                                   
1 Although, to be fair, a number of studies have pointed out that the convexity of the relationship between 
returns and years of schooling implies that increases in education might actually lead to temporary increases 
in earnings inequality.  See, for instance: Langoni (1973); Knight and Sabot (1983); Reis and Barros (1991); 
and Lam (1999). 
2 Additional demographic and occupational information for Ceará is contained in Table 1.  
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and fertility behaviour at the household level, and find that these matter a great deal to the 
overall picture. 
 
As expected, the effects of a substantial educational expansion on poverty incidence are 
very substantial. The impact on inequality, however, is much more modest. Because of the 
changes in fertility and labour supply, we find that a very large part of the distributional 
changes arising from greater education depend on the behaviour of women. And location 
would matter marginally more, rather than less: while we do not simulate the effects on 
migration, our simulated poverty profile indicates that of the (fewer overall) poor people, 
(proportionately) more would be in rural areas. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the reduced-form model of the 
income distribution which was estimated. Section 3 describes the specific simulation 
exercises which were undertaken. Section 4 highlights the main results, both for earnings 
and for household incomes, and suggests some interpretations. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  The model 
In order to understand the impacts of different policies aimed at increasing educational 
endowments in the population of Ceará, we estimated a simple model of household income 
determination. The model builds on Ferreira and Paes de Barros (1999), which was in turn 
heavily influenced by Bourguignon et al. (1998) and Bourguignon et al. (2001).3 This 
model—which is estimated on 1999 PNAD data for the state of C eará—is recursive, and 
consists of five blocks, as follows: 
 
Block I: household income aggregation 
 










i i h Y L L w Y 0 p  
 
This equation simply adds up labour incomes for all household members, across the two 
sectors into which we assume the labour market is segmented: a wage sector (denoted by 
the superscript  w) and a self-employment sector (denoted by the superscript  se).  L might 
have denoted hours, but given the nature of the information on labour supply in the PNAD 
data, it is actually a 0 -1 partici pation dummy. Hence,  wi denotes the labour earnings of 
individual  i in sector  w, and  ði denotes the profits of individual  i in the self-employment 
sector. The final term comprises all reported non-labour incomes accruing to the 
household. 
 
Block II: earnings equation 
 




i i X Logw e b + =  




i i X Log e b p + =  
                                                   
3 See also Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993).  
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Equations (2) and ( 3) are standard Mincerian earnings equations, estimated separately for 
the two labour market sectors.  Both formal (‘com carteira’) and informal (‘sem carteira’) 
workers were treated as wage sector workers. Own account (‘conta própria’) workers were 
treated as self-employed. Employers were grouped alongside wage workers. Workers were 
assigned to the sectors of their principal occupation. The vector  X, as is customary, 
contained characteristics both of the worker and of the job. In this case,  X included years of 
schooling (year dummies), age, age squared, age*schooling, gender dummy, race (white, 
non-white), spatial (RM Fortaleza, other urban, rural) and sector (agriculture, services, 
industry). The estimation results for both equations are reported in Table 2. 
 
Block III: occupational choice 
 

















  where s, j = (0, w, se)         
 
This block models the choice of occupation (into wage employment, self-employment or 
inactivity) by means of a discrete choice model —specifically, a multinomial logit—which 
estimates the probability of choice of each occupation as a function of a set of family and 
personal variables, namely: age, age squared, education, age*education, gender, race, 
spatial location, family composition, average age in the family (excluding the individual), 
average education in the family (excluding the individual), dummy if head of household, 
dummy if the head is inactive, dummy if spouse.  
 
Note that this occupational choice model is written in reduced form, as it does not include 
the  wage rate (or earnings) of the individual (or of its family members) as explanatory 
variables. Instead, his or her productive characteristics (and the averages for the household) 
are included to proxy for earning potential. This approach is adopted to maintain the 
econometrics of joint estimation (with Block II) tractable.4 Inactivity was used as the 
reference occupational category. The estimated coefficients of the model and the marginal 
effects they imply are reported in Table 3. 
 
Block IV: demographic choices 
 
(5)                   ML (nc | a, e, r, s, n a) 
 
This block uses a similar model to (4), which we now write in short form—ML stands for 
multinomial logit. This estimates the probability of choosing a certain number of children 
(0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5+), as a f unction of the woman’s age, education, race, spatial location, and 
the number of adults in the household. The variable used for the number of children in the 
estimation refers to the number of sons and daughters of the mother, which were alive and 
living i n the household at the time of the survey. Five or more children was used as the 
                                                   
4 See Bourguignon et al. (1998) for a discussion.  
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reference category. The estimated coefficients of the model and the marginal effects they 
imply are reported in Table 4. 
 
Block V: educational choice 
(6) 
This block models an individual's choice of final education attainment (in terms of years of 
schooling), as a function of his or her age (a), race (r), gender (g) and spatial characteristics 
(s), which are grouped in the matrix M. Unlike Blocks III and IV, educational choice 
follows a specific ordering by years, and is therefore more appropriately represented by an 
ordered probit model (OPM). This approach models the probability (conditional on M) that 
an individual chooses education level e i as the difference between the cumulative normal 
distribution ( Ö) evaluated at cut-off points estimated for levels e i and e i-1. The estimation 
results for (6), containing both the estimated values for ä and the seventeen estimated cut-
off points, are given in Table 5. 
 
Note that we do not place any emphasis on  the possible interpretations of equations (2)-(6) 
as reduced forms of utility-maximizing behavioral models. Instead, we interpret them as 
parametric approximations to the relevant conditional distributions; that is to say, as 
descriptions of the statistical associations present in the data, under some maintained 
assumptions about the form of the relevant joint multivariate distributions. See 
Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite (2002) for a more detailed statistical discussion of this 
kind of counterfactual analysis. 
 3.  Simulating Educational Expansions  
Educational expansions are not, of course, all alike. One would expect to obtain very 
different distributional results, say, from two policies, one of which aimed to triple the 
number of university graduates in the state, and another which aimed to halve the number 
of illiterate people. How exactly the histogram of the distribution of years of schooling 
changes matters as much as how the overall mean evolves. In addition—and as alluded to 
above—the same expansion in education will have different impacts depending on how 
demand for skills changes in the labour market. To allow for both of these concerns to the 
extent possible, six simulations were undertaken, corresponding to two different ‘policy 
choices’5, with different aims in terms of the distribution of education; and to three sets of 
assumptions about returns in the labour market.  
 
The first ‘policy’ was one of indiscriminate expansion. We simulate this as a rise in the 
mean of the distribution of years of schooling, from 4.5 (the observed level in 1999), to 
seven years. Of course, one might raise the mean of a distribution in very different ways. 
Since we observe how educational attainment is distributed jointly with age, gender, race 
                                                   
5 The term "policy" is used loosely here. The two scenarios are actually defined in terms of outcomes, rather 
than of policy decisions about inputs. We do not discuss which variables within the control of policy makers 
might be changed - or how they might be changed - in order to persuade individuals to alter their educational 
choices so as to generate these desired outcomes. Such a discussion lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] d d M e c M e c M e P s g r a e OPM i i i - F - - F = -1 : , , , | 
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and spatial location in the state, through our estimation of equation (6) above, we simulate 
the expansion in a manner consistent with that pattern. Specifically, we implemented a 
computer algorithm whereby the vector of cut-off points c(ei) in the ordered probit model 
was translated l eftwards by a constant vector  è > 0; such that c'(ei) = c(ei) - è. For each 
individual i, with observed schooling level e i and other characteristics M i, the model had 
been estimated so that c(ei-1) < Mi ä + æi < c(ei).6 
 
In the simulation, we simply re-compute the schooling level of individual i such that:      
c'(ei-1) < M i ä + æ i < c'(ei).  c' < c for all ei has the desired effect of increasing the frequency 
of educational choices at levels higher than those actually observed. The program iterated 
on successively higher values of è, until the mean of the simulated distribution of years of 
schooling converged to seven. By shifting the distribution in this manner, without altering 
the estimated values for ä, we preserve the observed conditionality of educational choices 
on other characteristics. 
 
The second ‘policy’ we investigate is a focused effort to reduce illiteracy. We change the 
distribution of education by moving  fifty percent of those individuals between the ages of 
15 and 40, and with four years of  schooling or less, to five years (exactly), by selecting 
those with the highest probability of moving from amongst all possible candidates. As 
before, this is implemented by translating the estimated cut-off points in the ordered probit 
model. This time, o nly the five first cut-off points are translated leftwards (by a constant 
value ê), such that the ensuing simulated cumulative distribution of years of schooling for 
15-40 year-olds (F') is, when evaluated at e = 4, equal to half of its observed value: F'(e=4) 
= 0.5*F(e=4). The original cumulative distribution function of years of schooling in Ceará 
in 1999 (for the population aged fifteen or older), as well as the two simulated 
distributions, are shown in Figure 1. 













0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Years
%
Original distribution of schooling
Rising the mean of distribution of schooling to 7 years
Reducing 50% of illiteracy
 
                                                   
6 The variable æ is an individual residual, the distribution of which is, by construction, a truncated normal 
N(0,1).  
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The results of each of these two educational ‘policies’ are simulated under three alternative 
returns scenarios, namely: 
 
1.  â99 : Keep all âs values as estimated for the 1999 regressions. 
2.  â convex: with respect to category 13+ (omitted), lower â for 0 -4 years of 
schooling by 20 percent; for 5 -8 by 15 percent; and for 9 -12 by 10 percent. To 
ensure the growth neutrality of these  changes, the constant term á was adjusted to 
maintain mean earnings (for that category of worker and for the original observed 
X matrix) constant at its observed 1999 level. 
3.  â concave: with respect to category 13+ (omitted), raise â for 0 -4 years of 
schooling by 30 percent, for 5 -8 by 20 percent and 9 -12 by 10 percent. The 
constant term was adjusted in a manner analogous to that in point (2) above. 
 
So the six simulations are given by the following schematic 2x3 matrix: 
 
Simulation  â (1999)  â concave  â convex 
Policy One       
Policy Two       
4.  Results 
The main simulation results are presented in Tables 6 and 7. Table 6 reports mean earnings 
and five different inequality measures, for each of the six simulations, for the distribution 
of labour earnings among e arners with positive labour incomes.7 Table 7 presents the 
corresponding results for the distribution of household incomes by individuals and 
includes, in addition to the same inequality measures as Table 6, three poverty measures—
P(á), for á = 0, 1 e 2. 8 The poverty line was set at R$68.00,  which is the line officially 
suggested by the Planning Institute of the State Government of Ceará, (IPLANCE). In each 
of the above tables, the measures presented in the row ‘Ceará’ of the panel â 99 are those for 
the actual observed distribution in 1999. The measures presented in the row ‘Ceará’ in the 
other two panels arise from imposing the simulated structure of returns (more concave or 
more convex) on the existing 1999 population—with its actual distributions of education 
and other characteristics. 
 
For  each of the six combinations of educational outcomes and returns, poverty and 
inequality statistics are presented for three different simulations, denoted by sets of Greek 
letters. The first of these, denoted by  á, â and ó
2 , consists of  running the required 
simulation—of the first or of the second "policy"—and feeding the simulated distribution 
of education through the earnings models (2) and (3), either unadjusted (â99), or adjusted 
(âconvex or â concave). Original residuals are used, and this generates a counterfactual (i.e. 
simulated) distribution of earnings, under the required assumption about returns, which 
corresponds to the new distribution of education. This educational distribution was, in turn, 
                                                   
7 The inequality measures used were the Gini coefficient, the Generalized Entropy indices for parameter 
values 0, 1 and 2; and the variance of logarithms. Simulated populations are also included, to show the 
simulated changes in participation. 
8 These are the poverty measures defined in Foster et al. (1984). Simulated populations included in Table 7 
reflect counterfactual changes in fertility behaviour.  
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obtained from simulating an increase in schooling according to the ordered probit model in 
(6). In this simulation, each individual preserves his or her initial (1999) occupation and 
family composition. All that may change is the amount of education they sell in the labour 
market and, for the convex and concave scenarios, the rate at which they do so. We call the 
result of this simulation the "pure market" effect. 
 
We know, however, that labour force participation and occupational choice are also 
heavily dependent  on education. It is natural to suppose that changes in schooling 
endowments such as the ones being simulated here for Ceará are likely to have some 
impact on who is working, and on where they are working. This is investigated by 
allowing the simulated distributions of education to feed through the occupational choice 
model (4), the parameters of which are denoted by ã’s. The second row in each panel thus 
summarizes the inequality and poverty statistics pertaining to the distributions which are 
simulated when, in addition to the educational endowment being transacted and to the 
structure of returns, we allow for occupational choices and labour force participation to 
change.9 These counterfactual distributions, denoted by "ã, á, â and ó
2", incorporate two 
effects: the "pure market" effect and the "occupational" effect.  
 
Finally, the third row allows for family size—driven by the number of children 
‘demanded’ by each family—to change also. This is achieved by allowing the simulated 
distributions of education to feed through the demographic choice model (5), the 
parameters of which are denoted by øs. This has two second-round effects on household 
incomes: first, as the number of children in a family changes, the income per capita 
denominator changes, and it is recalculated  accordingly. Second, the number of children in 
the household is, as it must be, an independent variable in the occupational choice multi-
logit model (4). In this row of simulations results the ãs and øs interact, since changes in 
occupational choice reflect not only chances in the educational levels of the individuals 
(and of others in their families) but also changes in the number of under-16s living in the 
household. The resulting counterfactual distributions, denoted by "ø, ã, á, â and ó
2", 
incorporate three effects: "pure market", "occupational" and "demographic". 
 
While the aggregated information presented in Tables 6 and 7 tell the basic story, 
additional insights can be gained from looking at the entire distribution. Figures 2 -13 plot 
the differences  in the logarithms of mean incomes for each percentile, between the 
simulated distribution and the real 1999 distribution: figures 2 -7 refer to the earnings 
distribution, while figures 8 -13 correspond to the distributions of household per capita 
income. Each distribution is ranked by its own distributed variable. The lines for á, â and 
ó
2 correspond to the "pure market" effect: simulations where each earner had his or her 
level of education changed to a level drawn for it in the new distribution of education, as 
described above. To simulate the concave and convex cases, the âs were changed as 
appropriate.  
 
As indicated above, in these simulations, people are selling more education on the labour 
market, but are still working in the same occupation as before,  and have exactly the same 
family composition. The lines that include a ã simulate the additional effect of those 
                                                   
9 In order to simulate the earnings of new entrants into the labour force, each needs to be allocated to a sector 
of activity (agriculture, industry or services). We did not model those choices explicitly, and thus simply 
allocate each entrant randomly, using the observed 1999 sector frequencies as probabilities.  
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changes in years of schooling on people’s labour force participation and/or occupational 
choices. And those that include a ø as well, also incorporate the effect of those extra years 
of schooling on the number of children each family is likely to have, and any subsequent 
additional impact which that may have on occupational choice. 
 
4.1  Effects on earnings 
The overall simulated effect of Policy O ne  - which consisted of raising mean years of 
schooling in Ceará from 4.5 to seven, in a manner which was consistent with individual 
propensities to acquire education  - turns out to be both (i) income-increasing and (ii) 
generally equalizing. This overall  effect is, however, rather sensitive to the assumptions 
about the behaviour of the returns structure. It also reflects the aggregation of pure market 
effects, occupational effects and demographic effects, which are heterogeneous and 
interesting in their own rights. 
 
The rise in mean earnings can be seen from a comparison of the simulated means under 
Policy One, with the ‘Ceará’ mean, in Table 6. In fact, mean incomes are higher than the 
actual 1999 mean (R$286.70) for all simulations, in all three returns s cenarios. They are 
highest, in fact, for the pure market effect. As labour market participation and occupational 
choice effects are incorporated, mean earnings fall under all three returns scenarios. This is 
largely due to the fact that most entrants have  earnings below the mean, thus contributing 
to its reduction.  
 
Despite these similarities in aggregate terms, the differences in the distribution of income 
gains across the returns scenarios are quite marked. This is particularly evident from 
inspection of Figures 2 -4: whereas the educational expansion would result in large gains  
(between 30% and 50%) for the very poor if returns to the low skilled rose (see Figure 3), 
the increases would stay in the 0-30% range if returns became more convex (Figure 4).  
 
Naturally, the effects on inequality also vary with respect to returns. When compared to the 
observed earnings Gini (of 0.590) in 1999, the pure market effects of an educational 
expansion would lower inequality if returns became flatter (Figure 3), but raise it in the 
other two cases. Another way of seeing this is that the pure market effect when the effect 
of changes in the structure of returns is netted out10  - is generally  inequality-increasing. 
This is the case for the Gini, E(0), E(1) and the variance o f logarithms in all cases.11 This 
confirms the results found by Langoni (1973), Knight and Sabot (1983) and Reis and 
Barros (1991), that educational expansions in the presence of convex returns may lead to 
increases, rather than declines, in inequality. 
 
This picture changes, however, when we allow for the impact of the educational expansion 
on participation and demographic behaviour. The Gini for the counterfactual earnings 
distributions that incorporate the occupational choice (ã), and demographic effects  (ø) of 
greater education is almost three points below that for the pure market effect in all three 
returns scenarios. In Figures 2 -4 it can be clearly seen that the occupational and 
                                                   
10 To see this, compare inequality measures in each á, â, ó
2 row with those in "Ceará" row in the same panel. 
11 E(2), which is driven largely by the upper tail of the distribution, goes the other way.  
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demographic effects12 make a difference at the tails of the distribution, r aising incomes for 
the poor and lowering them somewhat for the rich. As a result of the participation effects 
arising from more education and from fewer children, the labour force expanded by 
approximately 150,000 people each time the educational effect on occupational choice was 
taken into account. It turns out that the composition of the net entrants into the labour force 
is such that it lowers overall earnings inequality.  
 
Figures 14 and 15, which present the frequency of entrants (net of exits) per percentile of 
the distribution of household incomes, shows that the progressiveness of higher 
participation draws predominantly on the self-employment sector. The profile of net 
entrance into the wage sector is somewhat more regressive. Many of those entering into the 
higher ranges of the wage sector do, however, come themselves from self-employment.13 
Higher levels of education tend, in this sense, to upgrade the occupational profile, as non-
participants enter (largely) into self-employment, and many previously in that sector move 
into wage jobs.  
 
The effects of Policy Two  - which consisted of a targeted effort at reducing illiteracy, by 
halving the proportion of persons with four years of schooling or less  - were rather 
different. The rows for simulations under Policy Two in Table 6 reveal much smaller 
increases in mean earnings for the pure market effect, and actual declines for the complete 
simulation. Inequality reductions, however, were considerably larger for Policy Two than 
for Policy One. This is particularly true if returns stay constant or become more concave: if 
the â vector remained as in 1999, the overall effect of Policy Two on the Gini would be a 
fall of between three and four points. If the returns became more concave, the Gini would 
fall seven p oints, to approximately 0.52. This is a fairly serious change, and leads to an 
inequality level which is not high, by Brazilian standards.  
 
Figures 6 and 7 confirm that, for this particular policy, the configuration of returns is 
crucial: if returns to the unskilled rise, then the impact of having a little more education on 
the welfare of those who are at the bottom of the distribution will be positive and 
substantial. Most people in the bottom quintile of the distribution would have between 10 
percent and 40 percent higher earnings. If, on the other hand, Policy Two were combined 
with a decline in the returns to lower levels of schooling, as in Figure 7, then educational 
gains would just about exactly offset the impoverishing effect of the change in returns.  
 
4.2  Effects on household incomes 
When compared to the changes in earnings distributions, the simulations for household 
income distributions reveal both similarities and differences. Qualitatively, the market, 
occupational and demographic effects of both "policies" on the income distributions are 
                                                   
12 Figures 2 -7 reveal that the demographic effects are muted for earnings distributions. The line for the all-
effects simulation lies very close to the line for joint occupation and pure market effect simulation. This is 
because the only effect of reductions in fertility rates on earnings is through induced changes in participation  
and occupational choice. For households, the demographic effect also includes changes in the denominator of 
household income per capita and, as Figures 8-13 show, this makes them considerably larger. 
13 Recall that the simulations which include the ã parameters change the pattern of occupational structure 
across these two sectors, as well as changes in participation status.  
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rather similar to those observed for earnings. Policy One  - raising the mean education level 
to seven years  - increases mean incomes for all return scenarios, and does so by more than 
Policy Two in all cases. S ee Table 7. Policy Two only raises mean income in the pure 
market effect simulation, and leaves it basically unchanged after all effects are taken into 
account. In terms of inequality reduction, the rank of the two "policies" is reversed  - as in 
the case o f the earnings distributions. Policy Two leads to lower inequality than Policy One 
in every simulation, according to most (though not all) inequality measures. 
 
Perhaps the most marked difference between the per capita income results and those for 
earnings are that occupational choice and demographic effects seem to matter more for the 
former than for the latter. One explanation is that the demographic effect is considered 
fully in the household simulations: the reduction in the denominator of household per 
capita incomes, as a result of lower fertility, is explicitly taken into account here. Another 
part of the explanation comes from the fact that the individuals who are considered alone 
in the earnings distribution, are not organized into families in a  random manner. Hence, 
many of the entrants into the labour force turn out to reside in poor families and their new 
labour supply becomes highly equalizing in the distribution of household incomes. It is 
also chiefly among the poor that the effect of more schooling on fertility—to reduce the 
number of children in the household, thus raising per capita incomes—is particularly 
pronounced.  
 
It is thus that Figures 8 -10 have the curves with ã indicating larger income increases for the 
poor than the pure market effect simulation, and those with both ã and ø, higher still. The 
sharp downward turn in these log-income difference curves for the top 5% of the 
population also contribute to an equalizing effect. This is confirmed by inspecting the 
inequality measures in T able 7: from an observed 1999 level of 0.613, the Gini could fall 
by almost three points under Policy One (and around 5.5 points under Policy Two) if 
returns became more concave.  
 
Assumptions about the return structure continue to matter a great deal. If  returns 
convexified—which we saw was a powerful unequalizing force on the distribution of 
earnings—the Gini would rise by 1.5 points under Policy One, once all effects have been 
taken into account. If returns were identical to those of 1999, the Gini would stay roughly 
constant. The different returns scenarios are clearly still very important, generating only 
slightly less variation in outcomes in terms of household income inequality than was the 
case for earnings. This is because households pool resources, and provide insurance to 
individual members: even if assortative mating is very pronounced in Brazil14 (and we 
suspect, in Ceará), education levels still do differ across individuals in the same household, 
so that changes in returns hurt or benefit the pooled family less than it might hurt or benefit 
each member. 
 
The combination of rising mean incomes and falling inequality should spell good news for 
poverty reduction, as a result of the educational expansion simulated in Policy One. 
Indeed, with respect t o the state’s poverty line of R$68.00 per capita per month, we 
observe declines in poverty headcount (or incidence) as large as 12.9 percentage points (or 
about a quarter), when returns become more concave. Poverty simulation results also 
                                                   
14 The simple correlation coefficient between the years of schooling reported by household heads and their 
spouses in the 1999 PNAD (for all of Brazil) is 0.73, which compares with 0.63 in the US, for instance.   
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depend on the structure of returns, but somewhat less than inequality. If returns became 
more convex, Policy One would still lower P(0) by 9.8 percentage points, from the 1999 
level of 51.8 percent, to 42 percent. Each of these results takes into account all simulated 
effects of the greater endowment of education and, in particular, its labour supply, 
occupational and demographic impacts. Their importance is once again highlighted by the 
fact that, in their absence, the poverty reduction effect of the educational expansion  would 
be considerably smaller. Specifically, with constant returns, the fall excluding these effects 
would be of approximately seven percentage points, rather than eleven. 
 
Policy Two represents, as we have seen in the earnings simulation, a different choice along 
the mean-inequality trade-off. Targeted at the lower tail of the education distribution, this 
policy leads to smaller (or no) increases in mean income, for each stage of the simulation, 
and for each assumption about returns. On the other hand, it  also leads to greater 
reductions in inequality than Policy One for most (although not all) inequality measures, in 
all simulations in Table 7. In terms of the poverty results presented on that same table, the 
gains in inequality reduction from choosing Policy Two over Policy One fail to 
compensate for the smaller increases in absolute incomes that would ensue. In fact, poverty 
would be higher under Policy Two than under Policy One, for all return scenarios, all 
simulation stages and, somewhat surprising, for all three poverty indices considered. 
 
More important than the absolute number of poor people is an understanding of who they 
are and where they live. Table 8 shows the effects of the "policies" considered above on 
the composition of the poor, rather than just on their level. The profile is constructed by 
location, gender of the household head and schooling of the household head. The first 
column gives the composition of the total (actual) population in 1999, broken down by 
those categories. The next two  columns give poverty incidence in the subgroup (P(0)), and 
the share of the poor population which belongs to the subgroup (composition). The next six 
columns present counterfactual analogues to columns 2 and 3 for Policy One, under each 
alternative returns scenario. The last six columns do the same for Policy Two.  
 
The poverty profile is much more robust across "policies" and returns scenarios than 
absolute poverty levels were. Composition of the poor by gender is basically unchanged 
across all of the simulations. In contrast, some differences can be discerned across policies, 
for the educational and geographical dimensions of the profile. But these are not large. The 
profile by years of schooling hardly changes at all between the observed 1999 profile and 
that simulated for Policy Two. Under Policy One, however, it becomes slightly steeper, 
with a greater proportion of the poor having no education, and a smaller proportion among 
the most educated. One should always remember, of course, that this refers only to the 
composition of the poor. The P(0) columns served to remind us that under these simulated 
policies, the overall numbers of the poor would be smaller. 
 
Finally, although neither "policy" was designed in a spatially sensitive manner, Policy One 
appears to marginally reinforce the prevalence of rural poverty. This is largely because 
living in rural areas is currently associated with having lower educational attainment and, 
as a result, the ordered probit that assigns the distribution of extra years of s chooling 
among individuals, allocates them more often to urban residents, ceteris paribus. Hence, 
whereas 45 percent of Ceará’s poor today live in rural areas, this might rise to just over  
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fifty percent, if special care is not taken to encourage faster enr ollment and good school 
supply in rural areas.15 
5.  Conclusions  
As with most uses of econometric estimates to make out-of-sample predictions, the results 
of our microsimulation exercise should be treated with considerable circumspection.  
Probably even more than most. Household data is measured with substantial error. 
Educational data based on years of schooling, in particular, is famously a very poor 
measure for quality-adjusted human capital stocks. Our models of fertility and 
occupational choices are acceptable only as very reduced forms. And their parameters, as 
indeed all others, may very well change over time or as a response to policy reforms. 
 
Having said all this, the following four conclusions appear to receive broad support from 
our analysis, and m ight be of some use to those concerned with the impact of educational 
expansions on the distribution of economic welfare in developing societies. 
 
First, a broad-based expansion of enrollment and a reduction in evasion rates which raised 
average endowments of education (from 4.5 to seven years, in this case), would be very 
likely to make a substantial contribution to poverty reduction. Just how substantial seems 
to depend somewhat on how the structure of returns to education evolves. In this exercise, 
the s imulated decline in P(0) ranged from some ten points (or 20%) when returns became 
more convex, to thirteen points (or about a quarter) when they became more concave. 
These policies would not, however, have the same impact on inequality. While the 
simulated educational expansion (under Policy One) would be moderately equalizing if 
returns became more concave, it would be neutral if returns did not change. And inequality 
would actually rise if returns became more convex at the same time as the expansion took 
place. 
 
Second, a combination of policies which succeeded in expanding education in a more 
targeted way (by halving the share of 15-40 year-olds with 0 -4 years of schooling, in this 
case) would contribute to making educational expansions more progressive.  As noted 
above, in the presence of convex returns to schooling, educational expansions can be 
inequality-increasing. At best, an increase in the mean of schooling may have reasonably 
small reductions in inequality, as just reported for Policy One. A more t argeted effort, 
focusing on reducing illiteracy and keeping in school those most likely to leave, while not 
as likely to lead to large income gains across the population, can play an important role in 
reducing income inequality. Naturally, such a targeted  exercise should not be seen as a 
substitute, but rather as a complement, to a broader expansion of educational opportunities 
across the board.  
 
Third, as has already been noted, all results depend heavily on what happens to returns to 
education, which are determined by the interaction between the relative supply of and 
demand for different skills. In this paper, we did not model the demand side of the labour 
                                                   
15 Notice that the more targeted Policy Two does not seem to increase the rural composition of poverty in 
the same way. This is presumably because, being targeted to the least educated, it is effectively (if 
unintentionally) targeted to rural areas.  
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market at all. While we provided estimates for three possible scenarios, effectively 
considering a  range for the variation in returns, there is no guarantee that actual changes 
must remain within that range. Given that gains in labour earnings to the poor are very 
sensitive to these changes, a stagnation of demand for unskilled labour should cause 
particular cause for concern. The interaction between supply and demand for skills in the 
labour market has been an area of growing interest for researchers.16 These advances hold 
out the promise of improvements in our understanding of the interaction between 
educational outcomes and the distribution of income. 
 
Fourth, if our analysis shed any light at all on the impact of an educational expansion on 
the distribution of income in Ceará, it was on the crucial role played by household 
dynamics in the process. We s aw that the State appears to have something of a ‘reserve 
army’, awaiting conditions to enter paid or self-employment. As in other places where 
educational levels rose rapidly, this is to a large extent composed of women.17 As they 
acquire education and enter the labour force, their fertility behaviour also changes, 
reducing the number of children in the family.  
 
In income terms, each of these tendencies is positive for the families to which they belong. 
In fact, the participation and demographic changes arising from educational expansion 
account for a substantial share of the overall poverty reduction impact. Figures 8, 9 and 10 
illustrate the great importance of these gender-sensitive effects on the overall welfare of 
poor families. In the labour market, h owever, a large inflow of women into relatively 
underprivileged segments may generate downward wage pressure or enhance job 
competition. The extent to which Ceará will be able to capitalize on a more educated  
labour force depends, in large measure, on how effectively it ensures a level playing field 
for its women. 
 
In closing, it should be noted that a number of important choices, or dimensions of 
household and worker behaviour, remained outside the scope of our analysis. Key amongst 
these is the possible  decision to migrate. Greater endowments of education might affect the 
flows of migrants within the state—say, from rural areas to metropolitan Fortaleza—or 
outwards from the state. These decisions are likely to be determined by the relative 
conditions of l abour demand, and thus wages, in these areas, and in other states. This falls 
outside the scope of this simple model, but this does not make it any less important a 
concern for policy-makers. 
 
                                                   
16 Katz and Murphy (1992) and Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) have suggested methods to estimate 
changes in the demand for different labour skill categories, based on sectoral changes in the composition of 
economic activity. Robillard et al. (2001) combine a computable general equilibrium model and micro-
simulations to consider demand and supply changes in the labour market simultaneously and in general 
equilibrium. 
17 See Bourguignon et al. (2001) on the key role played by changes in female participation in the Taiwanese 
development process.  
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Number of People %
Population 6.979.143
Area
Metropolitan area 2.710.515 38,8
Urban non metropolitan 2.024.916 29,0
Rural non metropolitan 2.243.712 32,1
Education
0 2.659.053 38,1






9 to 12 725.831 10,4
13 or more 146.562 2,1
Age
0 to 15 2.554.366 36,6
16 to 19 621.144 8,9
20 to 24 593.227 8,5
25 to 29 509.477 7,3
30 to 34 488.540 7,0
35 to 39 439.686 6,3
40 to 44 355.936 5,1
45 to 49 300.103 4,3
50 to 54 258.228 3,7
55 to 59 237.291 3,4
60 to 64 202.395 2,9






Employed with positive income 2.376.618 -
Occupational status
Wage sector 2.189.963 68,2






Table 1: Some Basic Statistics: Ceará, 1999
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R2 coef std p-value R2 coef std p-value
0,60 0,49
Intercept 3,74468 0,13845 0,000 4,08840 0,36039 0,000
Education
0 -0,64439 0,12721 0,000 -2,06720 0,34671 0,000
1 to 3 -0,64560 0,12758 0,000 -1,80917 0,34941 0,000
4 -0,58645 0,13453 0,000 -1,60963 0,36074 0,000
5 -0,61238 0,15325 0,000 -1,69725 0,40503 0,000
6 -0,37910 0,17295 0,028 -1,22831 0,45498 0,007
7 -0,58931 0,15252 0,000 -1,15326 0,44791 0,010
8 -0,30600 0,14263 0,032 -1,03733 0,39813 0,009
9 to 12 -0,44252 0,12347 0,000 -0,92092 0,36618 0,012
13 or more - - - - - -
Age 0,09121 0,00502 0,000 0,08813 0,01042 0,000
Age2 -0,00066 0,00005 0,000 -0,00082 0,00008 0,000
Age * education
0 -0,03277 0,00318 0,000 -0,00619 0,00795 0,436
1 to 3 -0,03043 0,00333 0,000 -0,00924 0,00808 0,253
4 -0,02815 0,00347 0,000 -0,00888 0,00835 0,288
5 -0,02538 0,00446 0,000 -0,00127 0,01013 0,900
6 -0,03499 0,00509 0,000 -0,01196 0,01166 0,305
7 -0,02586 0,00441 0,000 -0,01572 0,01154 0,173
8 -0,03079 0,00392 0,000 -0,01169 0,00943 0,215
9 to 12 -0,01643 0,00328 0,000 -0,00409 0,00876 0,640
13 or more - - - - - -
Race - White 0,10523 0,01721 0,000 0,14007 0,03522 0,000
Gender - Male 0,46123 0,01666 0,000 0,94254 0,03865 0,000
Metropolitan area 0,44765 0,03182 0,000 0,30244 0,05620 0,000
Urban non metropolitan 0,11562 0,03477 0,001 0,10798 0,05443 0,047
Rural non metropolitan 0,00000 0,00000 0,000 0,00000 0,00000 0,000
Sector of activity
Agriculture -0,17467 0,03842 0,000 -0,67360 0,05685 0,000
Industry 0,07316 0,01912 0,000 -0,10259 0,05074 0,043
Services/commerce/other 0,00000 0,00000 0,000 0,00000 0,00000 0,000
Source: PNAD/IBGE 1999
Earnings Self-employed
Table 2: The Estimated Earnings Equations for Ceará 1999 
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coef p-value dPw/dx coef p-value dPse/dx
Gender - Male 1,120 0,000 0,083 1,928 0,000 0,231
Age 0,181 0,000 * 0,263 0,000 *
Age2 -0,002 0,000 * -0,003 0,000 *
Education
1 to 3 0,794 0,000 * 0,776 0,004 *
4 0,512 0,030 * 0,954 0,001 *
5 0,840 0,011 * 0,828 0,064 *
6 -0,356 0,329 * 0,340 0,526 *
7 0,268 0,408 * 1,007 0,043 *
8 0,444 0,094 * -0,331 0,433 *
9 to 12 0,985 0,000 * 0,956 0,002 *
13 or more 2,536 0,000 * 2,541 0,000 *
Age * education
1 to 3 -0,015 0,002 * -0,012 0,033 *
4 -0,008 0,139 * -0,015 0,020 *
5 -0,019 0,070 * -0,006 0,625 *
6 0,017 0,142 * 0,004 0,813 *
7 0,005 0,596 * -0,017 0,234 *
8 -0,004 0,553 * 0,015 0,161 *
9 to 12 -0,008 0,134 * -0,014 0,049 *
13 or more -0,023 0,017 * -0,044 0,003 *
Metropolitan area -1,361 0,000 -0,147 -1,882 0,000 -0,199
Urban non metropolitan -1,055 0,000 -0,151 -1,086 0,000 -0,088
Average endowments of age  -0,004 0,123 0,000 -0,004 0,113 0,000
Education among adults in his or her household
0 -0,517 0,005 -0,123 -0,039 0,864 0,044
1 to 3 -0,340 0,077 -0,108 0,244 0,298 0,077
4 -0,444 0,036 -0,126 0,176 0,493 0,075
5 -0,252 0,287 -0,072 0,105 0,729 0,044
6 -0,422 0,099 -0,122 0,182 0,566 0,074
7 -0,338 0,168 -0,081 -0,014 0,965 0,031
8 -0,495 0,025 -0,137 0,154 0,591 0,076
9 to 12 -0,763 0,000 -0,192 0,047 0,843 0,084
13 or more -1,011 0,000 -0,231 -0,174 0,626 0,069
Numbers of adults in the household 0,008 0,669 0,005 -0,029 0,250 -0,006
Numbers of children in the household 0,021 0,217 -0,002 0,073 0,000 0,011
The individual is the head in the household 0,606 0,000 0,018 1,319 0,000 0,174
The individual is not the head in the household 0,143 0,168 0,067 -0,326 0,035 -0,072
The individual is the spouse in the household 0,136 0,110 -0,017 0,510 0,000 0,077
If not the head, is the head active? -0,101 0,420 -0,032 0,073 0,705 0,023
Intercept -2,214 0,000 - -6,103 0,000 -
Source: PNAD 1999/IBGE
Note: * Marginal effects were not computed for the interaction variables.
Self-employment/employer sector
Table 3: The Estimated Occupational Choice Multilogit Model
Wage sector 
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coef p-value dP0/dx coef p-value dP1/dx coef p-value dP2/dx coef p-value dP3/dx coef p-value
Race - White 0,281 0,115 0,023 0,271 0,127 0,017 0,245 0,170 0,009 0,152 0,420 -0,006 -0,357 0,122
Numbers of adults in the household -0,669 0,000 -0,078 -0,408 0,000 0,001 -0,281 0,000 0,028 -0,288 0,000 0,015 -0,201 0,003
Age 0,093 0,000 0,013 0,045 0,000 -0,001 0,028 0,000 -0,004 0,021 0,000 -0,003 0,014 0,028
Education
1 to 3 0,163 0,392 -0,011 0,219 0,247 0,005 0,292 0,130 0,020 0,158 0,450 -0,005 0,239 0,309
4 0,889 0,000 0,031 0,683 0,006 -0,026 0,981 0,000 0,042 0,915 0,001 0,016 0,403 0,190
5 1,689 0,001 0,020 1,602 0,001 -0,005 1,972 0,000 0,075 1,778 0,000 0,020 1,178 0,027
6 1,886 0,001 0,043 1,886 0,001 0,036 2,034 0,000 0,063 1,752 0,002 0,001 0,829 0,204
7 24,163 0,000 0,426 24,105 0,000 0,341 24,334 0,000 0,342 23,832 0,000 0,136 21,949 .
8 2,411 0,000 0,106 2,212 0,000 0,039 2,320 0,000 0,056 1,811 0,001 -0,031 0,968 0,117
9 to 12 2,834 0,000 0,164 2,490 0,000 0,051 2,453 0,000 0,036 1,830 0,000 -0,057 1,007 0,072
13 or more 23,886 0,000 0,508 23,503 0,000 0,327 23,500 0,000 0,281 23,075 0,000 0,110 21,236 .
Metropolitan area 0,761 0,000 0,101 0,469 0,008 0,011 0,291 0,105 -0,029 0,106 0,572 -0,040 0,040 0,852
Urban non metropolitan 0,301 0,146 0,076 -0,011 0,957 -0,015 -0,037 0,857 -0,018 -0,204 0,351 -0,031 -0,118 0,638
Intercept -1,777 0,000 - -0,032 0,905 - 0,164 0,521 - 0,258 0,359 - -0,066 0,841
Source: PNAD 1999/IBGE




Table 4: The Estimated Demographic Choice Multilogit Model
1 2 3 4 
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coef std p-value
Age -0,025 0,000 0,000
Gender - Male -0,206 0,001 0,000
Race - White 0,426 0,001 0,000
Metropolitan area 1,085 0,001 0,000































Earnings Gini E(0) E(1) E(2) V(log) Population
b b99
Ceará 286.7 0.590 0.650 0.784 2.223 1.116 2,275,534
First Policy - Raising mean schooling to 7 years
a a ,  b  b e s  s
2 2
401.6 0.616 0.722 0.796 1.923 1.306 2,275,534
g, a g, a ,  b  b e s  s2 2
382.5 0.592 0.650 0.719 1.663 1.169 2,425,989
y, g, a y, g, a  ,  b  b e s  s2 2
379.9 0.588 0.642 0.710 1.646 1.159 2,422,323
Second Policy - Reducing illiteracy by 50%
a a ,  b  b e s  s
2 2
292.8 0.584 0.634 0.763 2.132 1.093 2,275,534
g, a g, a ,  b  b e s  s2 2
270.4 0.552 0.555 0.652 1.659 0.975 2,297,828
y, g, a y, g, a  ,  b  b e s  s2 2
270.8 0.551 0.554 0.653 1.685 0.971 2,295,578
b bconcave
Ceará 286.7 0.556 0.569 0.683 1.821 0.998 2,275,534
First Policy - Raising mean schooling to 7 years
a a ,  b  b e s  s
2 2
374.8 0.584 0.638 0.709 1.623 1.164 2,275,534
g, a g, a ,  b  b e s  s
2 2
356.6 0.556 0.563 0.620 1.291 1.025 2,425,989
y, g, a y, g, a  ,  b  b e s  s
2 2
358.1 0.557 0.564 0.621 1.292 1.024 2,421,087
Second Policy - Reducing illiteracy by 50%
a a ,  b  b e s  s
2 2
290.3 0.553 0.562 0.673 1.778 0.989 2,275,534
g, a g, a ,  b  b e s  s
2 2
266.9 0.515 0.478 0.547 1.214 0.865 2,297,828
y, g, a y, g, a  ,  b  b e s  s
2 2
268.5 0.518 0.483 0.555 1.238 0.867 2,295,065
b bconvex
Ceará 286.7 0.616 0.717 0.864 2.593 1.218 2,275,534
First Policy - Raising mean schooling to 7 years
a a ,  b  b e s  s
2 2
419.9 0.639 0.791 0.866 2.207 1.428 2,275,534
g, a g, a ,  b  b e s  s
2 2
399.7 0.616 0.719 0.794 1.987 1.290 2,425,989
y, g, a y, g, a  ,  b  b e s  s
2 2
396.6 0.613 0.710 0.783 1.963 1.279 2,422,323
Second Policy - Reducing illiteracy by 50%
a a ,  b  b e s  s
2 2
293.6 0.607 0.693 0.836 2.470 1.183 2,275,534
g, a g, a ,  b  b e s  s2 2
271.5 0.578 0.617 0.734 2.062 1.068 2,297,828
y, g, a y, g, a  ,  b  b e s  s
2 2
271.9 0.578 0.616 0.736 2.107 1.064 2,295,578
Source: PNAD/IBGE 1999
Table 6: Counterfactual Distribuitions of Individual Earnings: Descriptive Statistics
Inequality 





Income Gini E(0) E(1) E(2) V(log) Population P(0) P(1) P(2)
b b
99
Ceará 135.3 0.613 0.733 0.846 2.421 1.378 6,978,331 51.8 24.4 15.3
First Policy - Raising mean schooling to 7 years
a a  , b  b  e s  s
2 2
172.4 0.630 0.786 0.846 2.093 1.534 6,978,331 45.1 21.1 13.2
g, a g, a  , b  b e s  s
2 2
174.6 0.618 0.751 0.794 1.856 1.490 6,978,331 43.4 19.9 12.3
y, g, a y, g, a  , b  b e s  s 2 2
181.6 0.610 0.728 0.765 1.739 1.461 6,669,583 40.9 18.3 11.1
Second Policy - Reducing illiteracy by 50%
a a  , b  b  e s  s
2 2
137.2 0.607 0.716 0.827 2.349 1.353 6,978,331 50.1 23.4 14.5
g, a g, a  , b  b e s  s
2 2
130.9 0.587 0.665 0.760 2.059 1.283 6,978,331 50.1 22.9 14.0
y, g, a y, g, a  , b  b e s  s 2 2
133.0 0.582 0.651 0.747 2.010 1.252 6,868,846 48.9 21.8 13.2
b b
concave
Ceará 135.3 0.587 0.664 0.766 2.106 1.275 6,978,330 48.6 21.8 13.3
First Policy - Raising mean schooling to 7 years
a a  , b  b  e s  s
2 2
163.7 0.606 0.716 0.776 1.866 1.414 6,978,330 43.4 19.7 12.0
g, a g, a  , b  b e s  s
2 2
165.7 0.592 0.680 0.720 1.618 1.374 6,978,330 41.4 18.5 11.1
y, g, a y, g, a  , b  b e s  s 2 2
173.3 0.585 0.657 0.697 1.522 1.321 6,682,688 38.9 16.7 9.9
Second Policy - Reducing illiteracy by 50%
a a  , b  b  e s  s
2 2
136.4 0.583 0.656 0.756 2.069 1.263 6,978,330 47.4 21.3 12.9
g, a g, a  , b  b e s  s
2 2
129.7 0.561 0.601 0.681 1.750 1.186 6,978,330 47.1 20.7 12.4
y, g, a y, g, a  , b  b e s  s 2 2
132.4 0.558 0.592 0.678 1.752 1.155 6,860,223 45.9 19.8 11.7
b b
convex
Ceará 135.3 0.631 0.785 0.905 2.683 1.459 6,978,331 54.2 26.3 16.8
First Policy - Raising mean schooling to 7 years
a a  , b  b  e s  s
2 2
178.3 0.648 0.841 0.901 2.300 1.629 6,978,331 46.1 22.3 14.1
g, a g, a  , b  b e s  s
2 2
180.6 0.636 0.807 0.851 2.069 1.587 6,978,331 44.5 21.1 13.3
y, g, a y, g, a  , b  b e s  s 2 2
187.6 0.628 0.782 0.820 1.936 1.556 6,669,583 42.0 19.5 12.0
Second Policy - Reducing illiteracy by 50%
a a  , b  b  e s  s
2 2
137.5 0.624 0.763 0.882 2.593 1.424 6,978,331 52.3 25.0 15.8
g, a g, a  , b  b e s  s
2 2
131.2 0.606 0.713 0.818 2.314 1.357 6,978,331 52.3 24.6 15.4
y, g, a y, g, a  , b  b e s  s 2 2
133.4 0.601 0.698 0.806 2.262 1.323 6,868,846 51.1 23.5 14.5
Source: PNAD/IBGE 1999
Poverty
Poverty line equal R$68,00
Inequality
Table 7: Counterfactual Distributions of Household per Capita Incomes: Poverty and Inequality 
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Frequency P(0) Composition P(0) Composition P(0) Composition P(0) Composition P(0) Composition P(0) Composition P(0) Composition
Ceará 51.79 40.88 42.01 38.85 48.89 51.12 45.90
Metropolitan 38.80 35.61 26.68 21.13 20.06 21.71 20.05 21.32 21.29 32.57 25.85 34.15 25.92 31.32 26.48
Urban 29.00 49.86 27.92 39.60 28.10 41.16 28.41 36.94 27.57 46.23 27.42 48.52 27.53 42.84 27.07
Rural 32.10 73.08 45.30 65.90 51.75 67.31 51.43 62.12 51.32 71.30 46.81 74.26 46.63 66.55 46.55
Men 48.70 52.84 49.69 42.09 50.15 43.18 50.05 39.97 50.10 50.02 49.82 52.32 49.85 46.79 49.65
Women 51.30 50.80 50.31 39.72 49.85 40.90 49.95 37.80 49.91 47.82 50.18 49.97 50.15 45.05 50.35
Years of schooling
0 38.10 63.54 46.74 53.53 49.89 55.44 50.28 50.54 49.56 60.32 47.01 63.13 47.05 56.11 46.58
1 6.50 68.23 8.56 57.37 9.12 58.97 9.12 55.34 9.26 63.68 8.47 66.78 8.49 61.29 8.68
2 8.00 62.86 9.71 51.71 10.12 53.60 10.21 49.16 10.12 59.02 9.66 61.26 9.59 54.62 9.52
3 7.80 58.72 8.84 47.34 9.03 48.12 8.93 44.74 8.98 54.68 8.72 57.66 8.80 51.33 8.72
4 10.20 50.11 9.87 38.31 9.56 38.66 9.39 37.10 9.74 46.86 9.78 49.33 9.84 44.57 9.90
5 5.30 49.20 5.03 33.87 4.39 34.46 4.35 32.54 4.44 47.37 5.14 50.35 5.22 44.59 5.15
6 3.60 45.64 3.17 26.86 2.37 27.05 2.32 26.28 2.44 43.94 3.24 45.35 3.19 41.96 3.29
7 3.50 39.70 2.68 23.61 2.02 23.79 1.98 23.61 2.13 38.96 2.79 40.78 2.79 36.15 2.76
8 4.50 26.19 2.28 15.38 1.69 15.57 1.67 14.63 1.69 25.07 2.31 25.35 2.23 23.82 2.34
9 1.80 27.60 0.96 21.07 0.93 22.05 0.94 19.92 0.92 26.52 0.98 27.27 0.96 26.49 1.04
10 1.60 22.02 0.68 18.36 0.72 17.91 0.68 17.01 0.70 22.31 0.73 22.22 0.70 21.93 0.76
11 6.50 10.31 1.29 4.08 0.65 4.08 0.63 3.32 0.55 9.91 1.32 9.79 1.25 9.69 1.37
12 0.40 1.53 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.30 0.02 2.30 0.02 1.53 0.01
13 0.30 2.05 0.01 1.03 0.01 1.03 0.01 1.03 0.01 2.05 0.01 2.05 0.01 2.05 0.01
14 0.20 1.44 0.01 1.44 0.01 1.44 0.01 1.46 0.01 1.44 0.01 5.05 0.02 1.44 0.01
15 1.00 0.29 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.29 0.01 0.29 0.01
16 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
17 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Source: PNAD/IBGE 1999
bconvex bconcave
Raising mean schooling to 7 years
Table 8: Actual and Simulated Poverty Profiles for Ceará
bconcave bconvex Observed values b99
Reducing illiteracy by 50%
b99
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